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STRIKES, PICKETING AND THE CONSTITUTION
ARCHIBALD COX*
The law's first response to organized labor activities was to attempt
to define by judicial decision the ends for which employees might resort to
economic weapons against an employer,' the weapons which they might use
in pursuit of lawful objectives, 2 and the occasions on which resort to economic
weapons would be curtailed, as in the case of a nationwide railroad strike,
because of the danger of a public catastrophe.3 The effort was unsuccessful.
The judge-made law was neither a reflection of the enduring sentiment of the
community nor a response to its needs. The subsequent reaction, which
took its initial legislative form in the Clayton Act 4 and reached fruition in the
enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act5 and parallel state legislation, led
to the virtual elimination of law from the resolution of industrial conflicts
and left their adjustment to the processes of negotiation backed by economic
weapons. For a time, indeed, there was reason to believe that this view of
labor policy had partly achieved constitutional status. 7
Our primary reliance is still upon collective bargaining, but during
the middle forties there was a widespread, if not deep-seated, return to the
view that the law has a useful role to play in the conflicts of interest between
employers and employees. Many of the extreme provisions found in both
state and federal labor legislation enacted in these years were the result of an
uncritical public reaction to newspaper accounts of the excesses of "the
public-be-damned" type of union leaders, a reaction which industrialists who
had never accepted collective bargaining as a permanent institution were
quick to turn to their advantage. But these circumstances, I suspect, would
have had little influence in the absence of two more fundamental factors.
One factor was an increasing awareness of the interdependence of our
economy which was widely believed to make economic warfare in basic in-
dustries intolerable. The second underlying factor was the conviction that
unions sometimes pursued objectives quite inconsistent with accepted notions
of fairness and sound policy, and sometimes used weapons that ought to
*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
William H. Isaacson, third year student at Harvard Law School, assisted in doing
research for this article.
1. E.g., Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906) ; Plant v. Woods, 176
Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
2. E.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
3. It re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092 (1895).
4. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1947).
5. 47 STAT. 70 (1932) 29, U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq. (1947),
6. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2:29-77 et seq. (1939); N.Y. Civ. PaAc. AcT § 876-a;
WIs. STAT. §§ 103.51 et seq. (1949).
7. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093
(1940); Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945), appeal disniissed by
stipulation, 326 U.S. 690 (1945).
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be banned. Strikes against labor board certifications, or by a closed union
for the closed shop, illustrate objectives that most of our society, including
union men, condemn. There would be greater debate, but one would also
find a large measure of agreement, on the undesirability of such methods
of pursuing lawful objectives as mass picketing and extreme forms of
secondary boycott. Out of the melange grew a variety of'statutory restric-
tions upon a union's right to invoke its economic power.
8
It was inevitable under our constitutional system that labor, having been
defeated in the legislatures, should carry the fight to retain its immunity in
the courts. It would be no more than an example of the Court's functioning
as a balance wheel if it were to invalidate the most extreme and ill-considered
restrictions upon labor's right of self-help. Thus the most important, con-
stitutional litigation in the field of labor relations during the past decade has
concerned the power of the state or federal government to restrict the use
of the strike, the picket line, the blacklist, the boycott and other economic
weapons. It seems probable that this will also be a predominant issue of the
nineteen fifties unless it is pushed aside by the activities of a new National
War Labor Board.
Although the various forms of concerted employee activity have too
much in common to permit complete separation even for the purposes of
discussion, considerably greater clarity of analysis can be achieved by
focussing attention upon one form* at a time and upon the simplest, first.
I. THE STRIKE
The strike is the simplest and most fundamental of labor's economic
weapons. Its rudiments are the concerted cessation of work by agreement
among employees for the purpose of inflicting upon their employer losses
sufficient to induce him to grant the terms that they demand. Quite plainly
employees have an interest in using the strike as a means of securing ob-
jectives which they deem important. The question is whether this interest
is accorded recognition as a constitutional privilege, either qualified or
absolute. A priori it might be a privilege guaranteed by either the Fifth,
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment
In view of the Court's recent approval of Mr. Justice Brandeis' famous
dictum that there is no absolute right to strike,9 it may seem supererogatory
8. For short descriptions of the legislation, see Dodd, Some State Legislatures Go
to War-On Labor Unions, 29 IowA L. REv. 148 (1944) ; Annual Reports of the Com-
mittee on State Legislation, Labor Law Section of the American Bar Ass'n, 72 A.B.A.
REP. 393 (1947), 73 id. 113 (1948), 74 id. 151 (1949).
9. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311, 47 Sup. Ct. 86, 71 L. Ed. 248 (1926), quoted
with approval in International Union, U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 245, 259, 69 Sup. Ct. 516, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949).
1951 ]
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to analyze again the reasoning which has led the courts to repudiate the con-
tention that involuntary servitude is imposed by the restriction of freedom
to strike. But the analysis is prerequisite to resolution of the infinitely more
difficult problem of determining where the line lies between permissible restric-
tions upon strikes and forbidden interference with the individual's right to
be free from compulsory servitude.
One group of cases holds the Thirteenth Amendment inapplicable to
strikers because a, striker suspends his services without permanently severing
the employment relation, hoping thereby to induce his employer to accede
to his demands.' 0 The factual distinction is undeniable but its significance
for constitutional purposes, apart from the element of combination, seems
doubtful. While the immediate purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment may
have been to abolish a system of slavery under which a man might be owned
as a chattel, there was also the broader intention "to render impossible any
state of bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which
the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit
which is the essence of involuntary servitude."" The amendment seeks to
maintain "a system of completely free and voluntary labor"' 2 because it is
only under such a system that workers may improve their wages and condi-
tions of employment.
"[In general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or
treatment is the right to change employers. When the master can compel and the
laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and
no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.""
Under this philosophy can it matter whether the worker quits per-
manently or merely leaves the establishment until conditions are changed?
In the former case he may be said to be exercising the right to sell his
services to the highest bidder, leaving others to take his former job, while
in the latter case he is seeking to injure the employer by cutting off the
supply of labor. But this reasoning scarcely justifies a constitutional distinc-
tion, for in either case the improvement of employment conditions ultimately
depends upon a withholding of labor from marginal employers until they
offer more. Cutting off the supply of labor by a strike is likely to be more
effective-and also to have greater impact upon the public-not because the
10. NLRB v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 181 F.2d
126, ±32 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 340 U.S. 902 (1950) ; NLRB v. National Maritime
Union, 175 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950); France
Packing Co. v. Dailey, 166 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1948) ; People v. United Mine Workers,
70 Colo. 269, 201 Pac. 54 (1921) ; Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum and Resilient Floor
Decorators' Union, 229 Minn. 87, 39 N.W2d 183 (1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S.
906 (1950).
11. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241, 31 Sup. Ct. 145, 55 L. Ed. 191 (1911).
12. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17, 64 Sup. Ct. 792, 88 L. Ed. 1095 (1944).
13. Id. at 18.
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quitting is temporary but because it almost always involves an attempt to
induce other workers to follow the same line of action. Since we are ac-
customed automatically to link concerted action with temporary suspension
of work, it is easy practice to focus on either characteristic. When they
are separated for the purposes of logical analysis, however, the temporary or
permanent character of the, quitting seems irrelevant.'
4
In modern industrial society the right of the individual to change em-
ployers, or alone to suspend his services, is often scant protection against
substandard wages or oppressive conditions of employment. Thirty years ago
Mr. Justice Taft stated the reason for strikes:
"A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent
ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer
refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave
the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give
laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer. They united to exert influ-
ence upon him and to leave him in a body in order by this inconvenience to induce
him to make better terms with them. They were withholding their labor of economic
value to make him pay what they thought it was worth. The right to combine for such
a lawful purpose has in many years not been denied by any court."'
Pressing Mr. Chief Justice Taft's statement a little further, it may be
urged with considerable force that in terms of the purposes of the Thirteenth
Amendment the strike is the modem -counterpart of the right to change em-
ployers, hence the application of the amendment ought to be extended to cover
the strike. Opposed to this consideration is the fact that the very conditions
which make group action the worker's only effective method of self-help also
distinguish strikes from individual quittings. The coherent action of an
organized group carries power that could never be exercised by individuals
but, in our highly integrated economy, it also has vastly greater and wider
repercussions.
The latter considerations have usually been thought predominant.
Numerous cases have held that the prohibition of a strike does not violate
the Thirteenth Amendment because the amendment is concerned only with
the freedom of an individual.'" The distinction has been conscientiously ob-
served in federal and state laws dating back at least to the Railway Act of
14. For a contrary view, see Williams, The Compulsory Settlement of Contract
Negotiation Labor Disputes, 27 TEXAs L. REv. 587, 625-26 (1949).
15. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184,
209, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189 (1921).
16. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, 2 F.2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 1924), aff'd, 6 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1925); Local 170, Transport
Workers Union v. Gadola, 322 Mich. 332, 34 N.W.2d 71 (1948); State v. Traffic Tele-
phone Workers' Federation, 2 NJ. 335, 66 A.2d 616 (1949); Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street etc. Employees, 257 Wis. 43, 42
N.W.2d 471 (1950), cert. granted, 340 U.S. 874 (1950); see Texas & N.O.R.R. v.




1927.17 On the whole, the conventional analysis seems sound. Where the
force and consequences of group action are so different from anything which
individuals could set in motion acting alone-either today or when the
Thirteenth Amendment was adopted-it would be unwise to force both kinds
of conduct into a single constitutional pigeon hole. The constitutional problem
of reconciling the public interest in uninterrupted production with the interest
of the worker in self-improvement through group action can be handled better
under the due process clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Nevertheless, the traditional distinction between combination and in-
dividual action is not without its difficulties; and it is in this borderline area
that doubtful cases may arise. In 1947 the United Mine Workers advanced
the transparent claim that the work stoppage in the bituminous coal mines did
not result from a strike sponsored by the union but from the decision of in-
dividual miners to suspend work because of unsatisfactory conditions of
employment.' 8 The claim was advanced again in 1950 under circumstances
which gave it considerable plausibility, although there are those who say
that the district court's refusal to hold UMW responsible resulted from
judicial blindness to facts of common knowledge. 19 Whatever the truth may
be, it requires no stretch of the imagination to envisage a situation in which
employees steeped in trade unionism, with strong group loyalties, stop work
en nmasse without a signal from their leaders, further organized activity, or
even entering into a new agreement to act together. Would the imposition of
sanctions against individual workers under these circumstances violate the
Thirteenth Amendment?
If such a spontaneous strike were merely the parallel action of many
individuals, it would be easy to say that since the laborer has an absolute
right to suspend work, or to quit his employment, he can scarcely be supposed
to lose the right merely because other laborers wish to take similar action.
Actually, two other elements are present. First, each worker knows that all
are taking, and will continue to take, parallel action in quitting or returning
to work, not by coincidence but in order to exert the power of a combination.
While they may suffer from lack of the organization and common direction
that gives strength to strikes sponsored by a union, they nevertheless have
the power that goes with concert of action. Second, this kind of concerted
activity raises serious problems-probably it is possible-only when the work-
17. Railway Labor Act, § 9(8), 44 STAT. 577, 586 (1926), 45 U.S.C.A. § 159(8)
(1943), explained StN. REP. No. 222, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1926); War Labor
Disputes Act, 57 STAT. 163 (1943), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 1501 et seq. (1944) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 453.15 (Supp. 1950); PA. STAT. ANN. § 213.16 (Purdon, Supp. 1947); Wis.
STAT. § 111.64 (1949).
18. United States v. United Mine Workers, 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948), acf'd,
177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).




ers have been members of a well-organized, tightly knit union. The bonds
created by common loyalties and a long history of successful group activities
substitute for explicit agreement and unified command.
Some of the major problems of constitutional law, in the field of labor
laws if not elsewhere, arise from the necessity of shaping guarantees born of
an individualistic society to the conditions resulting from the solidarity of
organized groups. It will not do simply to push all constitutional safeguards
aside on the ground that they pertain to individuals and not to groups. Yet
it seems probable that the Thirteenth Amendment should be held inapplicable
to group activity of any kind. In the past the rights which it guarantees have
been regarded as absolute. Exceptional obligations have been permitted, where
they had had historial acceptance, such as the duty to bear arms, 20 to work
on the highways,21 and to fulfill a contract as a seaman.2 2 The pressure of a
wartime emergency may extend the government's power to compel citizens
to ber arms to requiring them to render other services for which there is a
national necessity even though such a doctrine would involve forced labor for
a private employer reaping private profit.2 3 But to take the next step and
uphold interdiction of a strike on the ground that service may be compelled
whenever the public need is great enough, rather than on the ground that the
Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to group activities, would go beyond
the recognition of exceptional kinds of service and lay the foundation for a
doctrine that the right to be free from involuntary servitude is not absolute
but may be qualified by the legislature if the public interest requires. To refuse
to extend the Thirteenth Amendment to group activities would not deny
organized workers all constitutional protection against oppressive legislation.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments remain applicable. Hence to remit
groups to the latter guarantees seems wiser than to analyze group activities
in terms that may strain the chief constitutional bulwark of individual freedom.
B. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
On principle the interest of employees in freedom to strike is cognizable
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Recourse to a strike involves
the association of individuals into a group and the combined withholding of
personal services. Withholding personal service is surely an exercise of
"liberty" in the constitutional sense; and although the point is not clear on
the decisions, the concept seems broad enough to include freedom of associa-
tion. The fact that the strike is a weapon-a form of self-help-used to
advance the workers' interest in wages, hours and other terms and conditions
20. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. 349 (1918).
21. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 36 Sup. Ct. 258, 60 L. Ed. 672 (1916).
22. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 Sup. Ct. 326, 41 L. Ed. 715 (1897).
23. Cf. Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring in United States v. United Mine Work-
ers, 330 U.S. 258, 328, 329, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947).
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of employment does not militate against the claim to some degree of con-
stitutional protection. A constitution which assures the owner of property an
opportunity to obtain a reasonable return on his capital must recognize the
worker's interest in the conditions under which he labors and the price he
receives for his work. And, as Mr. Chief Justice Taft observed in an opinion
quoted above,2 4 modern industrial organization makes the worker's opportu-
nity to improve his wages and conditions of employment dependent upon asso-
ciation and collective bargaining, backed by freedom to strike.
It may clarify these generalizations to illustrate them in caricature.
In the State of Ames cotton is king. There would seem little room to question
the power of the Ames legislature to require employers and employees to
submit to a state board of arbitration for final and binding decision, without
strike or lockout, any labor dispute threatening to interrupt the ginning, com-
pressing or storing of cotton during the harvesting season. This is not an
unreasonable method of securing the uninterrupted operation of businesses
which, in Ames, might well be deemed essential to the public welfare.
25 But
the Ames legislature, instead of providing for compulsory arbitration, has
enacted a statute, the sole consequence of which is to make it a crime for
the employees of any employer engaged in ginning, compressing or storing
cotton to strike as a result of a labor dispute. No Ames statute fixes minimum
wages or provides a method of arbitration. Economic conditions would affect
the impact of the legislation, and might save it from invalidity if the labor
market were sufficiently tight for the laws of supply and demand to protect the
individual laborer. But in most Ames communities employment opportunities
are more limited, and one consequence of the legislation is likely to be to
compel workers to accept whatever wages their employers may offer.
It is submitted that the supposed statute is unconstitutional. The fault
is not that the statute curtails the right to strike. Continuous operation
of an essential industry is an end which the legislature surely may seek to
achieve. The vice is that the legislature chose an arbitrary method of attaining
a permissible goal. Despite the availability of alternative remedies, the statute
sacrifices the employees' interest in fair wages completely by depriving them
of their only effective weapon in competing with employers over the division
of the joint product of capital and labor. Many employee interests may be
subordinated to the general welfare, but it is submitted that the interest in
fair wages is too great to be overridden merely on the ground of legislative
preference for this method of securing continued operation of the industry.
The guaranty of due process demands "that the law shall not be unreasonable,
24. See p. 577 supra.
25. See pp. 581-83 infra.
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arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."
26
If it is correct to conclude that a restriction upon strikes is invalid under
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment unless the requirements of substantive
due process are satisfied,2 7 the constitutionality of each restriction must be
determined by pursuing two lines of inquiry. Are the interests which the state
has sacrificed overbalanced by the interests which it has sought to secure?
Was the sacrifice necessary to advance the preponderant interests? Striking
the balance requires value judgments for which there is no final measure
however often we may speak of "a rational basis," "a clear and present
danger," or "a balance [not] inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free
people."28 But detailed analysis can help to canalize the judgment by sub-
stituting understanding of the probable consequences of the legislation for the
emotional impact of slogans like "the public interest" and "the right to strike."
(1) Strikes Threatening an Imminent Public Disaster
During the last five years a number of states have enacted statutes out-
lawing strikes which threaten to interrupt the operation of public utilities aid
substituting an impartial determination of any dispute over wages, hours and
working conditions for resolution by strike or lockout. Although the Supreme
Court has recently held that these statutes cannot be applied to industries
covered by the National Labor Relations Act because of federal pre-emption,28a
statutes had been uniformally sustained by state tribunals against attack as a
denial of due process of law.
29
26. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
The familiar closing paragraph of Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349 (1921),
does not support the conclusion that a legislature is always free to sacrifice the interests
of one party to a labor dispute, without examination ,of its merits, whenever conditions
are such that they "cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community."
His conclusion was that the legislature "while limiting individual and group rights
of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of justice for the more primitive
method of trial by combat."
27. The above conclusion is sometimes opposed on the ground that since the
state has power to forbid all combinations to fix prices, it must have power to forbid all
combinations to fix wages. There are three answers to the argument: (1) A distinction
should be recognized between combinations relating to the distribution of property and
associations of individuals in the performance of personal services. (2) The antitrust
laws deal primarily with the further combination of prior aggregations of capital. (3)
If and -when employees attain an economic position comparable to businesses subjected
to the antitrust laws, it will be time enough to consider where a strike for higher
wages should not be equated to price-fixing schemes for constitutional purposes.
28. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 479, 70 Sup.
Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995 (1950).
28a. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, etc., Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 71 Sup. Ct. 359 (1951).
29. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street etc.
Employees, 257 Wis. 43, 42 N.W.2d 471 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 383,
71 Sup. Ct. 359 (1951) ; see Local 170, Transport Workers Union v. Gadola, 322 Mich.
332, 34 N.W.2d 71 (1948) ; State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation, 2 N.J. 335, 66
A.2d 616 (1949). The last two cases invalidated the Michigan and New Jersey statutes
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However unwise compulsory arbitration may be, the decisions are sound
enough on the "due process" issue. In the main, the statutes assure both sides
a fair hearing in which their respective interests will be evaluated and the
balance struck.30 Nor is the denial of freedom to strike, standing alone,
enough to invalidate the legislation. Workers resort to concerted action be-
cause it increases their power to influence the terms and conditions at
which they are employed. The strike is a means to an end. There is no reason,
therefore, to value it more highly than the interest which it is used to advance.
Those who would challenge the constitutionality of compulsory arbitration
laws must do so on the ground that they have a constitutional right to bargain
collectively.
There is persuasive evidence that collective bargaining in the form of
negotiation over wages and other basic conditions of employment cannot
survive in an industry subject to compulsory arbitration. Government regula-
iton tends to supersede private responsibility and so, in turn, breeds still
greater reliance on the sta te.31 But a collective bargaining agreement is a
private contract, and it is too late in the day to contend that liberty to fix
wages by private contract cannot be restricted. In 1923, Charles Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Indiestrial Relations3 2 held a compulsory arbitra-
tion law unconstitutional upon this ground when applied to a packing-
house, but the Court recognized that a different rule would prevail with
respect to businesses affected with a public interest.33 Later cases upholding
wage and hour laws effectively repudiated the constitutional philosophy under-
lying the Wolff decision, 34 and the decision itself was overruled in the closed-
shop cases2 5 The Court "has consciously returned closer and closer to the
earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legislate against what
are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business
affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal con-
for defects which could be cured. The New Jersey statute was amended and has now
been sustained. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of America, 5
N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950).
30. In the New Jersey Bell Telephone case, supra note 29, it was held, partly on
federal grounds, that the arbitrators were powerless to award a union security clause.
There is also a common report, to which I have no reference, that under the Wisconsin
arbitration law issues normally dealt with in collective bargaining cannot be the subject
of an award against a company because they curtail management prerogatives. It is
possible that such restrictions on the determination of the merits of a controversy would
permit attacking the statute as arbitrary in its method of securing uninterrupted public
utility services. See pp. 580-81, 590-91.
31. Kennedy, The Handling of Emergency Disputes, in Paoc. 2d ANN. MEETING
INDUST. REL. RIs. Ass'N 14 (1949).
32. 262 U.S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103 (1923).
33. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 347, 352, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. Ed. 755 (1917).
34. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 61 Sup. Ct. 862, 85 L. Ed. 1305 (1941) ; United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941) ; West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703 (1937); Nebbia v New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1937).
35. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 69 Sup. Ct. 251, 93 L. Ed. 212 (1949).
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stitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law." 36 Although this at-
titude had become familiar in cases involving business regulations, the closed
shop cases were the first in which the new constitutional philosophy was
applied to legislation directed against labor unions. If a state can regulate
wages and prices because of their effect upon the economy or standard of
living, a fortiori it has power to avoid a public catastrophe by resolving
wage disputes threatening to cut a community off from light, power or fuel.
Yet compulsory arbitration cannot be wholly assimilated to previous
regulations of wages and prices. Wage and price regulations control the terms
of agreements made voluntarily; they leave the parties legally free not to enter
into the relationship. The purpose of compulsory arbitration laws, on the
contrary, is to compel the parties to maintain an existing relation between the
company and the employees as a group. Furthermore, minimum wage laws
and price regulations have to do primarily with the use and expenditure of
property whereas the elimination of collective bargaining over wages, under
some circumstances, would have the practical, economic effect of forcing men
to labor upon the terms of the arbitration award. The pressure would be slight
where individuals had real opportunities to exercise their legal right to seek
other employment but as employment opportunities diminished, the pressure
would increase.
At present compulsory arbitration is confined to highly important busi-
nesses, chiefly public ultilities. The individual worker's right to seek other
employment furnishes a substantial escape from compulsion to labor upon
terms which he is powerless to control. In such industries the justification
for the legislation is at its peak. However, if the scope of compulsory arbitra-
tion laws were extended under public pressure for an easy escape from the
inconvenience and annoyance of strikes, the interference with freedom would
increase, and the justification might diminish, to such an extent as to put the
issue of constitutionality in serious doubt.
Sections 206 to 210 of the Taft-Hartley Act,37 which authorize injunc-
tions delaying strikes for 75 days, raise a somewhat different question. Since
the injunction deprives the workers of bargaining power during most of the
waiting period, the law sacrifices their interest in the immediate improvement
of wages and other conditions of employment. Against this injury must be
balanced (1) the public interest in uninterrupted production in vital in-
dustries; (2) the belief of Congress that the delay would afford time to work
out a peaceful solution of the controversy; and (3) the worker's right to seek
a retroactive settlement. There is no reason to question the uniform decisions
upholding these provisions of the Act3
8
36. Id. at 536.
37. 61 STAT. 136, 155-56 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 176-80 (Supp. 1950).
38. E.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 89 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1950);
1951 ]
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(2) Strikes for "Unlawful Objectives"
Under the traditional common law analysis peaceful concerted activities
were tortious and enjoinable if the employees' objective was judged insufficient
to justify the intentional infliction of harm.89 Insufficient objectives came to
be called "unlawful" in the special jargon of labor law. The usage is un-
fortunate. The term describes at least three kinds of purposes: (1) To induce
another (usually the employer) to commit a crime, tort or other breach of
legal duty. (2) To induce another to engage in conduct which is against
declared public policy but which is not prohibited by law. (3) To induce an-
other to engage in conduct which is lawful and not contrary to public policy
but which the court deems of such slight benefit to the employees as not to
justify a strike.40
(1) There can be little doubt concerning the power of state and federal
governments to forbid strikes for the first kind of objective. A number of
states have enacted laws outlawing closed shop, union shop and maintenance
of membership agreements in order to protect the freedom of the individual.
The statutes are constitutional. 4' No jurisprudence could tolerate such ob-
vious self-contradiction as to uphold these statutes but deny the states power
to deal with conduct which had no purpose except compelling violation of the
statute or punishing compliance. In pure theory this principle may even be
applicable to the conduct of individuals, and perhaps the state should be al-
lowed to deal with those who leave their jobs for such a purpose. In practice,
however, this application of the principle would involve too dangerous an
inquiry into individual motivation. A worker may prefer not working to
laboring under the conditions which the state prescribes. He may move to
another shop because he genuinely prefers the exclusive company of union
members. For the states to intervene in these instances would curtail liberty
of the person to a degree requiring far greater justification than that required
for an interference with liberty of contract. And since no sure way can be
devised in which to judge the individual's motive, it is better to leave in-
dividual quittings uncontrolled. Perhaps it was some such thought that led
Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge to insist that the Lincoln
Federal Labor Union decision should not be construed either to permit a
United States v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 78 F. Supp.
710 (N.D. Cal. 1948) ; United States v. United Mine Workers, 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C.
1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1950).
39. RE TATEmENT, ToRTs § 775 (1939).
40. For example, it has long been law in Massachusetts that closed shop contracts
are lawful and, when voluntarily executed, will be enforced. Nevertheless, until the
enactment of a statute in 1950, strikes for union security contracts were enjoined. Cont-
pare Hamer v. Nashawena Mills, Inc., 315 Mass. 160, 52 N.E2d 22 (1943), and earlier
cases cited therein, with Pashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E.2d 1
(1943), and earlier authorities.
41. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
69 Sup. Ct. 251, 93 L. Ed. 212 (1949).
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state to make illegal the concerted refusal of union members to work with
nonunion men or to imply that such a strike might be enjoined without
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
42
The caveat has less merit in the case of organized strikes and boycotts.
Group action has no value to workers motivated by a preference for idleness
or other employment. Workers resort to concert of action because it increases
their power to induce the employer to act in the way they desire. There is
no reason, therefore, to value the strike more highly than the interest which
it is used to advance. Where the state has constitutionally sacrificed that
interest to competing desiderata, as many states did in outlawing the closed
or union ship, it also has power to interdict strikes in pursuit of the forbidden
objective. The decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.43 establishes
this rule.
(2) It is equally plain that there is no constitutional right to strike for
the purpose of inducing another to engage in conduct which violates declared
public policy but which has not been prohibited by law. The issue was
settled in Building Serzice Employees Union v. Gazzam.t4 The anti-injunction
law of the State of Washington contains a conventional recital, copied from
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which declares that the individual employee "shall
be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents, in the designation of such representatives [for the purpose of negotiat-
ing terms and conditions of employment] or in self-organization or in other
concerted activities. . . ."" There is no statute implementing the declaration,
but the Supreme Court of Washington relied upon it in issuing a decree
restraining a union from picketing a hotel in support of the union's demand for
recognition as the bargaining representative of the hotel employees under a
union security contract, a demand which was pressed despite the employees'
desire not to be represented by the union. The Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed. Under the so-called public policy of Washington, Mr. Justice
Minton said,
"it is clear that workers shall be free t6 join or not to join a union, and that they
shall be free from the coercion, interference, or restraint of employers of labor in the
42. "But the right to prohibit contracts for union security i' one thing. The right
to force union members to work with nonunion workers is entirely another. Because of
this difference, I expressly reserve judgment upon the later question until it is squarely
and inescapably presented. Although this reservation is not made expressly by the
Court, I do not understand its opinion to forceclose this question." American Federation
of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 559, 69 Sup. Ct. 258, 93 L. Ed.
222 (1949).
43. 336 U.S. 490, 69 Sup. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949).
44. 339 U.S. 532, 70 Sup. Ct. 784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950). This case, like the
Hughes and Hanke decisions, which are next to be discussed, involved picketing. All three
decisions, however, appear equally applicable to strikes.
45. WASHr Ray. STAr. §§ 7612-1 et seq. (Remington, Supp. 1949). An identical
provision is found in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and similar state laws. Apparently,
the Supreme Court of Washington is the only one to interpret the provision as referring
to anything more than employer support of company dominated unions.
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designation of their representatives for collective bargaining. Picketing of an employer
to compel him to coerce his employees' choice of a bargaining representative is an
attempt to induce a transgression of this policy, and the State here restrained the
advocates of such transgression from further action with like aim.""
Hughes v. Superior Court4 7 makes it plain that the same rule applies to
policies developed by the courts.
(3) A far more'difficult issue was raised in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. Hanke.48 The Washington courts had enjoined a union of
automobile salesmen from picketing a used car dealer, Hanke, who had no
employees, for the purpose of compelling him to enter into an agreement,
signed by similar dealers, under which he would be obliged to close his
establishment after 6 P.M. weekdays and on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.
For Hanke to accede to the union's demand would not have violated State
policy. On this ground Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Minton distinguished
the Giboney and Gazzam cases. Mr. Justice Black also voted to reverse, ap-
parently on similar reasoning. But a majority upheld the injunction.4"
"Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment require prohibition by Washington also
of voluntary acquiescence in the demands of the union in order that it may choose to
prohibit the right to secure submission through picketing. In-abstaining from inter-
ference with such voluntary agreements a State may rely upon self-interest. In any
event, it is not for this Court to question a State's judgment in regulating only where
an evil seems to it most conspicuous."'
The reasoning reiterates an earlier declaration from Hughes v. Superior
Court: a state may "direct its law against what it deems the evil as it
actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may
do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those
that are allowed." 51
No one doubts the abstract validity of the quoted rule. The weakness
in the Hanke opinion lies in its failure to recognize that the Court is no longer
dealing with a situation in which there is a public policy opposed to the union's
goal, by whatever means it may be achieved. For the Hankes to have complied
with the union's demands would have been lawful. Probably the contract,
once executed, would have been enforced by the Washington courts. The
46. Building Service Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 538, 70 Sup. Ct.
784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950).
47. 339 U.S. 460, 70 Sup. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950).
48. 339 U.S. 470, 70 Sup. Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995 (1950).
49. Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate. Mr. Justice Clark concurred only in
the result. It is not clear whether his unwillingness to join in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter is to be attributed to disagreement on issue discussed in the text.
Probably not, for he joined in the prevailing opinion in the Hughes case. It is possible,
however, that he read the Hughes opinion as covering a case where the conduct re-
quested of the employer was contrary to state policy even though no remedy was pro-
vided and was unwilling to extend the reasoning to a case in which only the method of
inducement, and not its objective, was discountenanced by the state.
50. 339 U.S. at 479.
51. Id. at 468.
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decree must have been based, therefore, as in the case of the Massachusetts
injunctions against strikes for union security, on a state policy against the
use of concerted activities as a means of attaining an otherwise legitimate aim.
The category must be further divided. There can be no doubt of a state's
power to protect the community against the social and economic consequences
attendant upon the destruction of small, independent enterprises by the force
of organized economic power;52 and despite the competitive effect upon
labor standards, it is not unreasonable to conclude tfiat the preservation of
such enterprises requires freedom from rules imposed by an outside union
concerning the conduct of their businesses. 5' Similarly, a state should be free
to protect unorganized employees against economic compulsion to accept
a union as their bargaining representative after they have had a free op-
portunity to express their desires and have voted against the union.54 The
parties are reversed but the underlying principle is the same as that which
sustains minimum wage laws and labor relations acts protecting employees
against the employer's superior economic power.55
52. Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944).
53. In addition to the Hanke case, see National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (A),
61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (Supp. 1950); Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass.
70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947); Dinoffria v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 331
Ill. App. 129, 72 N.E.2d 635 (1947). But ef. Coons v. Journeymen Barbers, etc. Local
No. 31, 222 Minn. 100, 23 N.W.2d 345 (1946); Singer v. Kirsch Beverage, Inc., 271
App. Div. 801, 65 N.Y.S.2d. 400 (2d Dep't 1946).
54. In Building Service Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 539, 70 Sup. Ct.
784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950), the Court expressly noted that the Washington law had
not be construed "to prohibit picketing of workers by other workers." If such a
distinction were drawn, the pickets could easily change their demand to insistence that
the employees join the union and the employer, as soon as a majority joins, sign a
collective bargaining agreement. California and Oregon have drawn this distinction
[Peters v. Central Labor Council, 179 Ore. 1, 169 P.Zd 870 (1946); Park & Tilford
Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 165 P.2d 891
(1946) ] ; but it is difficult to believe that such nice discrimination on the part of a picket
on the choice of words has constitutional importance. The economic pressure of an
outside union can be as great an interference with freedom of choice as employer mis-
conduct. See e.g., Hall Freight Lines, Inc., 65 N.L.R.B. 397 (1946). Strikes and picketing
for the purpose of compelling an employer to recognize a minority union after the
union chosen by the majority has been certified are unfair labor practices under the
NLRA, § 8(b) (4) (C), and are unenjoinable in many states. R.H. White Co. v. Murphy,
310 Mass. 510, 38 N.E.2d 685 (1942) ; Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Shoe Salesmen's
Union, 288 N.Y. 188, 42 N.E.2d 480 (1942) ; Markham & Callow, Inc. v. International
Woodworkers, 170 Ore. 517, 135 P.2d 727 (1943); Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor
Council, 27 Wash.2d 193, 177 P.2d. 873 (1947); Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v.
International Woodworkers, 4 Wash.2d 62, 102 P.2d 270 (1940) ; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs
§ 794 (1939). Contra: Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union
269 App. Div. 757, 54 N.Y.S.2d 788 (2d Dep't 1945) ; Sachs Quality Furniture, Inc. v.
Hensley, 269 App. Div. 264, 55 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1st Dep't 1945) (holding that the picketing
could not be enjoined without infringing a right guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments). There is a slight trend towards granting the same protection to an
employer and his employees after they have voted against all union representation in a
labor board election. MAss. ANN. LAws c.150A, § 4(2) (c) (1949) ; Mass. Acts &
Resolves 1950, c.452; Loevin Apparel Shops v. Harlem Union, 24 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref.
Man.) 2567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); Madison & 40th, Inc. v. Townsend, 24 LAB. REL.
REP. (Ref. Man.) 2601 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949). Contra: Winston Radio Corp. v. Levine,
25 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). Under the view expressed-
above all these limitations are constitutional.
55. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed.
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But the case is different where the disputants have relatively equal power
and the state forbids a strike, thereby sacrificing the employees' interests, only
for the purpose of protecting the employer against the loss, and the com-
munity against the waste and inconvenience, attendant upon resort to eco-
nomic weapons. Neither the principle established by Giboney, Gazzain and
Hughes nor the ruling in Hanke is pertinent to this problem. Here the basic
question would seem to be whether, in the absence of a real threat to the
community, the due process clause guarantees employees freedom to engage
in collective bargaining, backed by strikes or boycotts, to advance self-interests
which they deem important and against which the state has not set its face.
Once this issue is reached, logical analysis will not supply the solution. The
answer depends upon the value of freedom to pursue one's wants by the only
effective means available. There is no practical meaning in the distinction
which Mr. Justice Jackson has suggested between the right to bargain col-
lectively and the right to strike.5 6 Employees have no barganing power as a
group unless they can withhold their labor as a group. Holmes, Brandeis and
a number of state court judges valued such liberty enough to dissent from
the prevailing tendency towards protecting the employer's business unless the
court approved the employees' objective. Eventually, their view gained wide
acceptance and in the case of picketing it seemed for a time to have achieved
constitutional status.57 The stream now flows in the other direction. Probably
the Court will hold that a state may constitutionally choose to advance the
public interest in the avoidance of waste and business losses except where
unusually important interests of the union would be adversely affected. Yet
893 (1937) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed.
703 (1937).
56. In International Union, U.A.W., v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 245, 259, 69 Sup. Ct. 516, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949) the Justice said-"The right to
strike, because of its more serious impact upon the public interest, is more vulnerable to
regulation than the right to organize and select representatives for lawful purposes of
collective bargaining which this Court has characterized as a 'fundamental right' and
which, as the Court has pointed out, was recognized as such in its decisions long
before it was given protection by the National Labor Relations Act. Labor Board v. Jones
& Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 33." The citation is to a passage in which Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes asserted "the legality of collective action on the part of employees in order to
safeguard their proper interests" and power of Congress "to make appropriate collective
action an instrument of peace rather than of strife." Although the word "strike" is not
used in the passage, the meaning of "collective action" is plain enough in the context.
Moreover, the passage cites and summarizes the well-known statement of Mr. Chief
Justice Taft concerning the need for collective bargaining as a means of overcoming
the helplessness of the individual employee in dealing with his employer. See p. 577
supra. Mr. Chief Justice Taft did not ignore the dependence of collective bargaining upon
the existence of freedom to strike. "Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to
deal on equality with their employer. They united to exert influence upon him and to
leave him in a body in order by this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms
with them." Ibid.
57. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940). Mr.
Justice Black is the strongest exponent of this position on the present Court. See Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 481, 70 Sup. Ct 773 94 L.
Ed. 995 (1950); Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 729, 62
Sup. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1143 (1942).
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it seems to me that even in the case of strikes this should not be held sufficient
to meet the requirements of substantive due process unless there is serious
and widespread injury to the community. Thus I would hold unconstitutional
a state rule of decision which enjoined strikes for the union shop despite the
fact that union ship contracts were valid and enforceable. Injury to competitors
and occasional public inconvenience are the inevitable costs of the "free struggle
for life."58 Where the struggle is not uneven, more should be required before
that freedom is ended.
But even those who hold this view must concede that their case is
harder if the union is using its economic power to bring about consequences
,it has set its face. Strikes against new machines often seem to fall within
which the state tolerates when they stem from other causes but against which
this category. The difficulty is that one can have little assurance of the true
grounds upon which the strike was forbidden. Management may suppress
patents or delay installing new equipment in order to avoid making existing
plant facilities obsolete before their cost has been recovered. Collective bargain-
ing practices, administrative agencies and Congress have recognized the im-
portance of mitigating the hardships caused by mergers, abandonments and
technological change. 9 These circumstances suggest that judicial opposition
to strikes against technological change is based not so much upon concern
for the costs of delaying the changes as upon a policy of protecting manage-
ment in its decision. Furthermore, if the state has set its face against the
supposedly undesirable consequences only when they result from the pressure
of concerted activities, does not this show that their avoidance,-is, by the
state's own standards, not a matter of serious public concern? Is it important
enough, then, to justify denying employees the opportunity to use organized
self-help in order to advance their interests ?"o
There is no blinking the weaknesses in this approach to the problems of
strikes and substantive due process. Perhaps the lines suggested are too fine
for the practicalities of constitutional adjudication. They may invite the
Court to adjudicate questions of policy instead of confining itself to issues of
constitutional power. But the alternatives are even less satisfactory. To decide
each case upon weighing and balancing the interests without systematic
58. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 107, 44 N.E.
1077, 1081 (1896).
59. United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 60 Sup. Ct. 248, 84 L. Ed. 208 (1939);
57 STAT. 5 (1943), 47 U.S.C.A. § 222 (Supp. 1950); REIGEL, MANAGEMENT, LABOR
AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, C.9 (1942).
60. In United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. IIl. 1946), judge LaBuy
held unconstitutional a statute which he construed to make it unlawful to engage in a
peaceful strike or peaceful picketing for the purpose of compelling a radio station to
employ unnecessary employees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that this issue
was not raised. 332 U.S. 1, 67 Sup. Ct. 1538, 91 L. Ed. 1877 (1947). In a separate opinion
Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed the opinion that the statute, so construed, was con-
stitutional. Id. at 13.
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analysis invites decisions based upon "inarticulate instincts" rather than
"definite ideas, for which a rational defense is ready." 61 The only other course
is to open the door to virtually uncontrolled regulation on the ground
that labor unions, by and large, are powerful organizations whose activities
raise social and economic questions belonging in the exclusive province of
the legislature. Probably this is the prevailing trend of constitutional opinion
today. But there will be those who, notwithstanding their awareness of the
danger of following the conservative wing of the old Court in reading per-
sonal views of policy into the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neverthe-
less believe that freedom to bargain collectively, with a right to strike, de-
serves a greater degree of constitutional protection.
One further problem remains for discussion. Two courses are open to
the legislature which determines that the social and economic costs of strikes
for particular objectives outweigh its advantages. The legislature may simply
forbid such strikes, thereby sacrificing the interest of the employees to the
will of the employer; or the legislature, "while limiting individual and group
rights of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of justice for the
more primitive method of trial by combat." ' I have already sought to
illustrate the constitutional significance of the choice in caricature. 3 The
California statute outlawing jurisdictional strikes furnishes an actual example.
The statute authorizes the issuance of an injunction against a peaceful strike
or picketing "arising out of a controversy between two or more labor or-
ganizations as to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to
bargain collectively with an employer on behalf of his employees."' 4 In fVoelt.
'v. Bakery & Confectionery, Workers Uvion,, 5 an AFL union struck in sup-
port of its demands in contract negotiations. At that time there was no other
union claiming to represent the plaintiff's employees, but shortly thereafter
an independent union made up exclusively of plaintiff's employees demanded
recognition and threatened to commence a strike and picketing. The NLRP.
refused to take jurisdiction on the ground that the controversy had insuffi-
cient effect on interstate commerce. A California court enjoined the picketing.
Despite doubts as to its wisdom, one could scarcely hope to argue that
such a restriction upon the right to strike is unconstitutional when the legisla-
61. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mfass. 92, 106, 44 N.E.
1077, 1080 (1896).
62. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488, 41 Sup. Ct. 172,
65 L. Ed. 349 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
63. See pp. 580-81 supra.
64. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1115-18 (Supp. 1949). The constitutionality of the statute
has been sustained against the allegation that it is too sweeping an interference with tile
right to engage in peaceful picketing. Meyers v. Cleaners & Dyers Union, 25 Lui.
REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2426 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1950) ; Voeltz v. Bakery & Confectionery
Workers Union, 25 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2461 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1950), Contra:
International Ass'n of Machinists v. San Diego Trades Council, 22 LAD. Ri.L. Rri'.
(Ref. Man.) 2012 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1948).
65. 25 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2461 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1950).
I VoI,. 4
STRIKES AND PICKETING
ture has established adequate procedures for determining the identity of the
majority representative and compelling the employer to bargain with the
designated union.00 But California affords the employees no such protection.
There is no state labor relations act and no judicial powei to enforce the
statute declaring the public policy in favor of collective bargaining. 7 Thus,
when there are two competing unions, the effect of the jurisdictional strike
law is to take from even a majority of the employees, without supplying a
substitute, their only effective method of realizing the right to bargain collec-
tively. The unnecessary sacrifice of so fundamental an employee interest, when
other methods of safeguarding the public can be devised, would seem to be
a plain violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.68
II. THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT
Legislation and common law rules forbidding secondary strikes and
secondary refusals to patronize have two purposes not involved in regulation
of a strike against an employer with whom the union has a direct controversy.
One is to protect from direct business losses persons in various degrees
of neutrality; the other, to prevent disputes from spreading through the
community. While differences of degree may be noted, it is enough for present
purposes to suggest that wherever both these considerations have substantial
relevance, they will furnish sufficient constitutional foundation for outlawing
concerted economic pressures.60
III. PICKETING
Although the common law treated the strike as a permissible method of
pursuing "lawful" labor objectives, picketing was slow to achieve the same
recognition. Many judges regarded all picketing as inherently coercive, and
therefore unlawful, however peacefully conducted and 'whatever the objective
66. See pp. 587 supra.
67. Nutter v. Pacific Electric Ry., 6 L A. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1067 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1940).
68. Cf. Wallace v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 26 LAB. REL. REP.
(Ref. Man.) 2645 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1950), upholding the provisions of the jurisdictional
strike law as applied to a strike over work assignments, partly on the ground that there
was an adequate, if extralegal, forum for the peaceful resolution of such conflicts.
Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the NLRA declare some strikes over work assignments to
be unfair labor practices. Section 10(k) seems to have been intended to supply an alterna-
tive method for resolving such disputes, but the NLRB has refused to disturb whatever
work assignment is made by the employer. 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 99-104 (1949). This
ruling might open § 8(b) (4) (D) to attack upon the analysis suggested in the text, but
it seems unlikely. The interest of the members of a particular union in a work assignment
is much less than the interest in collective bargaining.
69. NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir.
1950) ; NLRB v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 181 F.2d 126
(6th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, 178 F.2d 584
(2d Cir. 1949) ; Printing Specialties and Paper Converters Union v. LeBaron, 171 F.2d
331 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 949 (1949) ; State v. Casselman, 69 Idaho 237,
205 P.2d 1131, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949).
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might be.70 In some states the common law doctrine retained its vitality into
the nineteen-thirties 71 while other communities, some of them seeking to
attract new industries from unionized areas, revived earlier statutes or enacted
new laws making picketing unlawful per se."
2
Beginning in 1937 the Supreme Court arrested this development. In
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union,
7 3 Mr. Justice Brandeis held that a
state was not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment from authorizing a
union to engage in peaceful picketing as a means of carrying on a labor dis-
pute, saying: "Members of a union might, without special statutory authoriza-
tion by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech
is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
7 4
Although this assimilation of picketing to freedom of speech was plainly
dictum, it became the basis of decision four years later in Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 5 when the Court held unconstitutional an Alabama statute forbidding
picketing for the purpose of injuring any lawful business. Even more signifi-
cant than the decision was the fact that the Court's opinion was cast in the
language of the First Amendment. Picketing was held to be a practicable
and effective means "whereby those interested-including the employees di-
rectly affected-may enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor
dispute." In a companion case, the opinion declared-
"[P]ublicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through appropriate
means, whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded
as within that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.'
Out of the Thornhill case and subsequent decisions there arose serious
judicial uncertainty and much academic disputation"" as to whether peaceful
picketing is "an exercise of the right of free speech," or "more than free
speech," or essentially "a form of coercion unrelated to the free communication
70. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896); 1 TELLER, LABOR
DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 112 (1940); cf. American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189 (1921).
71. 1 TELLER, 10c. cit. supra note 70.
72. E.g., ALA. CODE § 3448 (1923) ; Ordinance of Shasta County, Cal., adopted as an
emergency law, 1938, cited in Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 109, 60 Sup. Ct. 746, 84
L. Ed. 1104 (1940), Record on Appeal 68A.
73. 301 U.S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 (1937).
74. 301 U.S. at 478.
75. 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940).
76. Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113, 60 Sup. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104 (1940).
77. See, e.g., Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J. 709
(1940) ; Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REv. 180 (1942) ; Dodd, Picket-
ing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. Rzv. 513 (1943) ; Teller, Picketing and
Free Speech: A Reply, 56 HARv. L. REv. 532 (1943) ; Jaffee, In Defense of the Supreme
Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 Micn. L. REV. 1037 (1943) ; Cox, The Influence of Mr.
Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MICH. L. REv. 767 (1950) ; Gregory, Constitutional




of ideas which is guaranteed by the First Amendment." So long as one speaks
of "peaceful picketing" simpliciter each of these seemingly inconsistent asser-
tions can be, and probably is, literally accurate. The term covers several
quite different sorts of conduct, some of which is essentially publicity and
propaganda, some of which is essentially economic coercion, and much of
which is a blend in which each of those qualities is present in varying de-
grees. Moreover, although the term "picketing" is used over and over again
in Supreme Court opinions as if it described a single type of conduct, in my
judgment the course of decision will not be clarified until the Court analyzes
the facts more closely.
When negotiation fails, a labor union must resort to economic power to
gain its objectives, either by withholding from the employer the services of
its members or by withholding, and inducing others to withhold, their
patronage. Success depends upon convincing the employer that it will be
cheaper to capitulate, or to compromise the union's demands, than to face
continuing losses. Since there are relatively few occasions on which picket
lines are set for the sole purpose of influencing public opinion, the role of
the picket nearly always is to give notice of, and secure adherents to, the
union's plan to injure the employer.
But despite this common economic purpose of virtually all picketing,
a sharp distinction between various kinds of picketing may be drawn accord-
ing to (1) the basis of its appeal for support and (2) the character of the
audience to which the appeal is addressed. Freedom of speech is an ideal born
during the enlightenment out of the faith that men can progress by the use of
reason if ideas are freely interchanged to be tested by debate and experience.
Nor can we seek to judge between appeals to reason and bare slogans arousing
prejudice or emotion. Much of our constitutional law grows out of this
philosophy. Discussion may be curtailed if, but only if, a "clear danger of
substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test
the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public
opinion."78 But if the speaker goes beyond discussion and invokes sanctions
to support his words, he cannot claim the same constitutional protection.
For this reason an employer may speak freely on labor questions but if he
does not leave his ideas to seek approval on their merits and instead of this
invokes fear of his economic power to induce obedience, the constitutional
privilege is exceeded and the state may intervene.79 "No one may be required
to obtain a license in order to speak. But once he uses the economic power
which he has over other men and their jobs to influence their action, he is
78. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed.- 1093 (1940).
Compare the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 372, 377, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927).
79. NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 62 Sup. Ct. 344, 86
L. Ed. 348 (1941).
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doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment. That is true whether he be an employer or an employee."P
S °
It is from this standpoint that the term "peaceful picketing" covers too
broad a range of conduct to have constitutional significance. The International
Brotherhood of Teamsters has made wide use of its ability to shut off the
flow of supplies into an establishment, or to stop the movement of its products,
merely by posting a single picket at each driveway normally used by incoming
or outgoing trucks. Other unions exercise similar power not by appealing
to the public but because of the discipline of their members. The critical point,
however, is not the success of such tactics but the fact that the union members
respect the picket line because of a group discipline based partly on common
loyalties, partly on the force of habit, partly on fear of social ostracism but
also on severe economic sanctions. The truck driver who crosses a teamsters'
picket line is subject not only to union fines but also to expulsion, and in the
trucking industry suspension or expulsion from the union may carry with it
loss of employment. In the Hollywood jurisdictional strike carpenters who
crossed a picket line established by their union were fined the equivalent of one
year's earnings. The constitutions and by-laws of other unions provide similar
sanctions and while reliable statistics are not available, it seems plain that
whenever the union is strong enough to exercise its power, the power will be
invoked, if necessary. In such cases picketing is not merely a method of self-
expression or of securing publicity, nor are the pickets seeking to secure
adherents by persuading others of the truth of what they have to say. The
picket's reliance in such a case is on the sanctions inherent in the discipline
and organized economic power of his union.
Quite different is the peaceful picketing which is directed primarily to
the general public. Familiar illustrations may be found outside motion picture
theatres, restaurants, and beauty parlors where none of the employees are on
strike. Theoretically such a picket line is entitled to the same respect from
union members as any other picket line, but as a practical matter the same
economic sanctions play little part. Prospective patrons who are not union
members are left free to determine their own course of conduct influenced
but not coerced by the knowledge that a labor dispute is in progress. In such
cases, therefore, the success or failure of pickets' appeal depends primarily
upon the persuasiveness of their message.
This distinction between picketing backed by the threat of economic
punishment and picketing which appeals only to reason, loyalty and other
emotions is paralleled by a difference in the audience which the pickets seek
to reach. The Teamsters' picket line is rarely addressed to individual mem-
80. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543, 65
Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945).
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bers of the public. Its primary, and often its exclusive purpose is to notify
union members and members of affiliated unions that they must not work in
the picketed establishment, or pick up or deliver goods, because their unions
are engaged in bringing economic weapons to bear on the employer. Despite
its element of publicity and propaganda, therefore, such picketing may be
fairly described as the signal by which the union invokes its economic power.8'
The pickets patrolling in front of a retail establishment are also bringing
economic pressure against the business-and in this respect the case is the
same-but their appeal is addressed to the public and the members of the
public decide chiefly as individuals whether to patronize the establishment
or to support the pickets' cause. Thus the publicizing is the primary element
and the disciplined economic power of the union is an insignificant factor.
In caricature the lines are always sharper than in life. The multitude of
picketing cases falls between these two extremes in the range of activities
covered by "peaceful picketing." The same picket line usually appeals both to
public opinion and to group discipline backed by economic sanctions. The
relative importance of the two appeals varies from case to case, presenting
such nice questions of classification that from time to time the differences may
be obscured. It is submitted, however, that the distinction is practicable and
that the constitutional decisions in picketing cases should depend, in part, on
whether the "publicity" or "signal" aspect predominates.
"Signal picketing" is entitled to no greater constitutional protection than
the combination it sets in motion. Some slight interference with the com-
nmunication of ideas may result, but it is inconsequential so long as other
avenues of expression remain open. The point was squarely decided in
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,s2 where the Court affirmed a Missouri
decree enjoining a union from picketing an employer in support of its demand
that the employer violate the local antitrust law by refusing to sell ice to
independent peddlers. The Court unanimously rejected the union's contention
that the injunction against picketing was an unconstitutional abridgment of
free speech because the picketers were peacefully publicizing the facts of a
labor dispute.
"[A]II of appellants' activities-their powerful transportation combination, their
patrolling, their formation of a picket line warning union men not to cross at peril
of their union membership, their publicizing-constituted a single and integrated course
of conduct which was in violation of Missouri's valid law. . . . [Therefore] it is
81. Cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439, 31 Sup. Ct. 492,
55 L. Ed. 797 (1911) : "In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the agreement to act in
concert when the signal is published gives the words 'Unfair,' 'We don't patronize,' or
similar expressions, a force not inhering in the words themselves, and therefore exceed-
ing any possible right of speech which a single individual might have. Under such cir-
cumstances they become what have been called 'verbal acts,' and as much subject to
injunction as the use of any other force whereby property is unlawfully damaged."
82. 336 U.S. 490, 69 Sup. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed 834 (1949).
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clear that appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free speech or press.
Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-777 [1942]. They were exercising
their economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by
union rather than by state regulation of trade.!'"
That this course of conduct resulted from speech and writing was immaterial
because "it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in
part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or. printed.' 8 4 Where the elements of speech are entwined with the
use of the unions' economic power, the speech loses its immunity from regula-
tion and the union's whole course of conduct becomes subject to the power of
the State "to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial com-
batants." The underlying principle of the Giboney decision is emphasized
by the authorities cited.8 5
Is "publicity picketing" entitled to a higher degree of constitutional
protection? In Hughes v. Superior Court,86 the Progressive Citizens of
America were cited for contempt for violating a decree enjoining them from
picketing one of a chain of grocery stores for the purpose of inducing the
stores to prefer Negroes in hiring new employees until their number became
proportionate to the percentage of Negroes among the customers. Mr. Justice
Traynor's dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court of California forcefully
stated the distinction between "signal" and "publicity" picketing.8 7 Neverthe-
less, the point was ignored when the decree was affirmed on certiorari. The
prevailing opinion, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter followed the practice
of speaking of picketing simpticiter as if the term described a single line of
conduct.
"Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same
information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the
very purpose of a picket line is to exert influence, and it produces consequences,
83. Id. at 498-503.
84. Id. at 502.
85. The opinion relies heavily on Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 319 U.S. 533, 63 Sup. Ct. 1214, 87 L. Ed. 1568 (1943), where the
Court had held that although an employer has a constitutional privilege to address
his employees on labor issues, the privilege is lost if he also invokes his economic power
over the employees. It also quotes two significant passages from Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945). The first was from the opinion of the
Court written by Mr. Justice Rutledge: "When to this persuasion other things are added
which bring about coercion, or give it that character, the limit of the right has been
passed. . . . But short of that limit the employer's freedom cannot be impaired. The
Constitution protects no less the employees' converse right. Of course espousal of the
cause of labor is entitled to no higher constitutional protection than the espousal of any
other lawful cause. It is entitled to the same protection." 323 U.S. at 537.
The second passage was from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas: "But
once he uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influ-
ence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment. That is true whether he be an employer or an employee." Id. at 543.
86. 339 U.S. 460, 70 Sup. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950).
87. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 850, 871, 198 P.2d 885, 897-98 (1948).
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different from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked and
exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word. '
Because of these compulsive features, the Court concluded, picketing may
be subjected to stricter regulation than other forms of communication. "The
effort in the cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional
protection of the element of communication in picketing and 'the power of the
State to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial com-
batants.' ",89 It is not altogether clear that this means that all picketing is
subject to the same degree of regulation as an organized strike.
The sharp divergences of opinion in Hughes v: Superior Court and its
companion cases make it impossible to discern any underlying philosophy
held in common by a majority of the justices, save that of greater tolerance
for State regulation. Yet if one may analyze -the cases simply for their value
as precedents, several conclusions are warranted:
(1) The First and Fourteenth Amendments are violated by any law
which makes picketing illegal per se. The key to the Thornhill decision is the
holding that the validity of the statute should be determined upon its face.
From that premise the conclusion followed that the conviction should be re-
versed if any of the activities condemned by the statute constituted an exercise
of freedom of expression. The Alabama courts had already held that the
statute forbade picketing of a retail establishment by a single picket who,
without speaking, carried a sign truthfully stating that the store employed
nonunion labor. Under this interpretation, which was binding on the Supreme
Court, the statute proscribed all picketing without regard to any other cir-
cumstance. The Court's ruling that a State may not make picketing unlawful
per se has not been affected by the subsequent cases.
(2) In American Federation of Labor v. Swing,90 the question before
the Court was the validity of "a decree which for the purposes of this case
asserts as the common law of a state that there can be no 'peaceful picketing
or peaceful persuasion' in relation to any dispute between an employer and a
trade union unless the employer's own employees are in controversy with
him." 91 The Illinois rule covered all kinds of picketing and apparently only
publicity picketing was involved in the litigation. The Court held that "[T]he
right of free communication cannot... be mutilated by denying it to workers,
in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in his employ." 92
Thus the constitutional right to engage in publicity picketing was extended
88. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465, 70 Sup. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985
(1950).
89. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 460,474, 70 Sup. Ct.
718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950).
90. 312 U.S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1941).
91. Id. at 325.
92. Id. at 326.
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to those who are not employees. In Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl,"
the same right was extended to persons who, according to state law, were not
engaged in a "labor dispute" even though they were seriously affected by the
employment conditions of which they complained. Finally, in Cafeteria Em-
ployees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 94 non-employees were held privileged
to picket a restaurant even though there was no labor dispute within the
meaning of the state statute, thus combining the rules established by the
Wohl and Swing cases.
Since Mr. Justice Frankfurter distinguished these decisions in the
Hughes and Hanke opinions, it is to be assumed that they would be followed
today if identical issues were presented. Their effectiveness, however, is
greatly impaired. In Building Service Employees Union v. Gazmam, 5 the
Court enjoined stranger picketing intended to put pressure upon an employer
to interfere in the employees' selection of a bargaining representative. Al-
though the point was reserved, the conclusion that a state may protect un-
organized employees in their choice of representatives against organized
economic coercion from outside the bargaining unit seems logically inescap-
able.96 There is no constitutional reason for requiring either policy to be
formulated by statute. Under such circumstances it should not be surprising
if some state courts suddenly discover that their antipathy to stranger picket-
ing is based upon one or the other of these considerations.
Similarly, only three lines in a judicial opinion separate lI'ohl and
Angelos from Hanke. In all three cases the injunction was based upon the
circumstance that the complainants carried on their businesses without em-
ployees. The New York courts said nothing more and the decrees were re-
versed. The Washington court seems to me to have concluded that a state
might prefer the right of an employer to carry on a lawful business over the
right of a union to engage in free speech where its interests were only re-
motely affected. Fortunately for the Hankes, however, the court also used the
phrases "individual proprietors" and "little businessmen and property owners"
in one sentence in its opinion. In these expressions the majority of the
Supreme Court discovered that the Washington injunction stemmed from an
important state policy which had not been applied by New York.07
93. 315 U.S. 769, 62 Sup. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942).
94. 320 U.S. 293, 64 Sup. Ct. 126, 88 L. Ed. 58 (1943).
95. 339 U.S. 532, 70 Sup. Ct. 784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950)
96. See p. 587 supra.
97. Hanke v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 33 Wash.2d 646, 659-60,
207 P.2d 206, 213 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REv. 313 (1950). It is not my purpose in making
the comments in the last two paragraphs to deny the existence of distinctions between
Swing and Wohl, on the one hand, and Garzam and Hanke, on the other. See Cox,
Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. R. lo
30 (1947). No careful formulation of policy based upon an evaluation of conflicting in-
terests, such as the Court held not unconstitutional in Ga.zzam and Hanke, was involved
in either the rule against stranger picketing or the New York practice of issuing an
injunction automatically upon concluding that no "labor dispute" was in progress. What
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(3) Picketing may be prohibited where its objective is "unlawful" in
the sense that the employer's capitulation would result in violation of a public
policy declared either by the legislature or the courts. This is the clear holding
of the Giboney, Gazzam and Hughes cases, and it appears to command
unanimous acceptance from the Court. Nothing to the contrary was decided
by earlier precedents.
(4) The Hanke case, as pointed out in our discussion of the right to
strike, appears to hold that picketing may be enjoined where the use of or-
ganized economic power against weaker members of the community will have
undesirable social and economic consequences. But since only three justices
joined with Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the prevailing opinion, the issue may
still be open. 8
(5) It is still unsettled whether picketing may be forbidden when its
objective is "unlawful" only in the Pickwickian sense that, although there is
no policy opposed to the union's attaining its objective by other means, the
court (or legislature) deems it insufficient to justify injuring the employer's
business and causing loss and inconvenience to the public. Thornhill v. Ala-
bama once seemed close to the issue-
"It may be that effective exercise of the means of advancing public knowledge
may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering into advantageous rela-
tions with the business establishment which is the scene of the dispute .... We hold
that the danger of injury to an industrial concern is neither so serious nor so imminent
as to justify the sweeping proscription of freedom, of discussion embodied in § 3448."''
But the case can be distinguished on the ground that the Alabama statute
did forbid picketing without regard to the importance or triviality of the
objective; and Hughes and Hanke, although they too are distinguishable,
look towards a different rule. The arguments pro and con resemble those
concerning parallel limitations on the right to strike, save that the element
of communication should give publicity picketing a higher constitutional
value.
The conclusions just stated, like the decisions themselves, offer no last-
ing solution of the underlying issue. The essence of the problem of the picket-
ing cases is to draw a line between the unquestioned privilege to discuss
industrial relations freely and the far more limited right to exert the economic
power of an organized group of workers held together by union discipline.
One solution is to accept the line which Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
drawn between picketing and other forms of communication. The "purpose of
a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, different
does give cause for great concern is the Court's astuteness in finding for recent in-
junctions some basis in a supposed state policy which will furnish a constitutional founda-
tion. But each reader will have to decide for himself whether this criticism is justified
by comparing the state court and Supreme Court opinions.
98. See note 49 supra.
99. 310 U.S. 88, 104-05, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940).
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from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked and
exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed
word." 10 One wonders whether the opinion does not mistake for peculiar
attributes of picketing characteristics which are common to all appeals for
assistance in industrial controversies. The blacklisting of "unfair" employers
and the circulation of lists of fair employers whom union men are asked to
patronize are also weapons of economic combat which contain an element
of communication. Such methods of communication exert the same kind of
influences and produce the same kind of consequences as picketing. The
circulation of an unfair list may signal the start of a boycott adherence to
which is enforced by the threat of union discipline. Where the union does
not impose economic sanctions, the member may be moved by the habits in-
culcated by union ritual, by common loyalties, by fear of social ostracism, and
by all those other psychological and emotional forces which bind individuals
into a group. Nor is it easy to distinguish between the circulation of a
blacklist and the publication of a notice in the press, or the writing of a letter
by the president of the union.
It is true, of course, that the picket line is the most effective of all these
methods of appealing for sympathy and assistance. The picket reaches his
audience at the moment for decision whereas the readers often forget the
names in a blacklist or newspaper advertisement. But this distinction-to
paraphrase Mr. Justice Douglas' 01-would seem to mean that a state can
prohibit speech where it is effective but cannot prohibit it where it is in-
effective. It can scarcely be supposed that the Court is heading towards such
a doctrine.
Picketing is also more effective because the sanctions behind its appeal,
both the threat of economic reprisal and the appeal to group solidarity, are
more apparent than in the case of other forms of communication. The union
worker who crosses the picket line not only subjects himself to immediate
hostility but he also knows that the pickets are there to report his conduct
to both the union and his fellow members. Yet this ground of distinction also
seems unsatisfactory. There should be no privilege to circulate a blacklist
which is the signal that sets in motion a prearranged boycott; certainly, there
can be none when the boycott is enforced by union discipline. Conversely, ,the
picket's appeal to the forces that bind union men together is the same in kind
as the appeal of the blacklist, of the union press, or of the speech of the
union leader. Differences in degree are the stuff of which constitutional law
is made, but it behooves us to draw lines that are maintainable.
102
100. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465, 70 Sup. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985
(1950).
101. Bakery & Pastry Drivers Union v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775, 62 Sup. Ct. 816,
89 L. Ed. 1178 (1942) (concurring opinion).
102. In recent years the most significant decisions concerning the circulation of
blacklists have arisen under NLRA § 8(b) (4) (A). Blacklists have been treated in the
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If I am right in thinking that the Court cannot long distinguish between
the picket line and the unfair list, or between the unfair list and other appeals
by the officers of a union to its members, two courses will be open. One is
to overrule Thornhill's case and all its progeny on the ground that the
privilege of free speech should not extend to attempts to coerce an employer
into granting concessions. Under this view, which has its persuasive ad-
vocates,10 3 newspaper and radio appeals to stay on strike until the employer
comes to terms, should receive no different treatment from picketing. Its
logical conclusion is that the constitution does not limit the states in regulat-
ing industrial relations in fields not pre-empted by federal regulation. 10 4
In terms of a purely political conception of freedom of speech the argu-
ment has considerable merit. There is a clear distinction between discussion-
looking forward, however, remotely, to political action and requests for im-
mediate economic assistance in driving a private bargain. On this view the
Thornhill and Virginia Electric decisions should be criticized alike. The
former case holds expressly, and the latter holds by necessary implication,
that the privilege of free speech may be invoked to protect utterances whose
purpose is to advance private economic objectives. The argument loses much
of its force, however, if the broader ground is taken that the First Amendment
embodies a concern for human liberty, as well as political rights, because
men know both a need, and often a duty, of expression. From this standpoint
it is of small moment that an employer arguing with his employees is think-
ing of retaining the prerogatives which management loses under' collective
bargaining, or that a worker bespeaking the aid of his fellows is seeking
immediate improvement of his standard of living. It is equally immaterial
that the arguments and entreaties may in the one case lead men to refrain
from joining the labor organization, thus lessening its economic power, and
in the other may induce workers and customers to break off economic rela-
tions with the employer, thus injuring a lawful business.
The other alternative is to draw the distinction already suggested be-
tween "signal" and "publicity" picketing and then to mark parallel differences
applicable to other union communications. The distinction has been questioned
on the ground that it asserts that "because signal picketing [which involves a
prearranged response] is intelligently effective, it does not qualify as con-
stitutionally protected communication, whereas publicity -picketing [which
same manner as picketing and, when part of a secondary boycott, have been held not
to be privileged under the First Amendment. See e.g., NLRB v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950), enforcing 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949) ;
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Sperry, 170 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1948) ; Cranefield
v. Bricklayers Union, 78 F. Supp. 611 (W.D. Mich. 1948). Contra: Sperry v. Denver
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 77 F. Supp. 321 (D. Colo. 1948).
103. See especially Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union
and Employer Conduct, 49 MicH. L. REV. 191 (1950).
104. Id. at 208-10.
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leaves the response to chance] is entitled to protection because its effect is
speculative."' 1 5 Of course, the ground of the distinction is not the consequence
of the picketing. The critical inquiry is whether the employees' conduct in-
volves an appeal to an uncoerced audience each individual in which is left
free to choose his own course of conduct or invokes the power of an organized
combination. The latter activities can scarcely claim immunity under the
First Amendment, even though they are entitled to some degree of protection
tinder the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and on them depends a strong
and free labor movement. But speech alone is surely a form of communication
even when it is addressed to those bound by common loyalties and looks to
economic assistance.
Speech in the private economic arena may not be entitled to the same
protection as discussion of political issues. Picketing, blacklists and similar
communications, even when they are not backed by an organized combination,
cause damage and serve no useful purpose where their sponsor is seeking to
compel a violation of a valid statute or to punish an employer who has com-
plied with the law. Perhaps secondary publicity picketing in extreme forms
should be subject to legislative condemnation. But the worker and his union
who are seeking an objective which is not itself inconsonant with the policy
of the State, should be free to appeal to others for their voluntary, individual
assistance.
105. Id, at 207. Professor Gregory's doubts about the validity of the distinction
because it "was lost on Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Reed" seem a little curious
in view of his distaste for their opinions on the subject of picketing. Nor can his opposi-
tion to mention of tile lement of conspiracy in an analysis of picketing be easily
reconciled with his readiness to dismiss the Thirteenth Amendment on the ground that
it applies only to individual quittings.
Those attacking the proposed distinction from a viewpoint diametrically opposed
to Professor Gregory's have argued that it would lead to the rule condemned by Mr.
Justice Douglas in the IVohl case: "That a State may prohibit picketing when it is
effective but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective." 315 U.S. 769, 776, 62 Sup. Ct.
816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942). There are two answers to this contention. In the first place,
the distinction between "publicity picketing" and "signal picketing" does not destroy
the efficacy of the Thornhill doctrine. The doctrine would continue to prevent a state
from treating picketing as inherently unlawful means of concerted activity apart from
the economic combination behind it, thereby forcing the legislatures to deal with the
substance of the employees' activities. Furthermore, the frequent use of publicity picket-
ing in front of retail establishments is evidence that it is not wholly ineffective. The
second answer, however, is that one need not shrink from the conclusion that the sug-
gested distinctions would permit the states to restrict the only picketing which is effective,
it must be because the picket's appeal to reason does not suffice, and the union there-
fore needs to support the appeal with threats of economic sanctions in order to attain
its objectives. But this is not a reason to extend the protection of the First Amendment
to "signal picketing." No one would seriously assert that the employer who cannot
persuade employees to resign from their union has a constitutional privilege to resort
to threats of economic reprisals because there is no other way to make his words effec-
tive. The parallel argument on the part of labor should receive no more favorable coni-
sideration.
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